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My starting point is two themes from Peirce: his familiar pragmatist conception of meaning 
focused on what follows from an application of a term rather than on what is the case if it is 
correctly applied, and his less familiar and rather startling claim that even purely 
deductive, logical reasoning is not merely formal but instead constructive or diagrammatic 
— and hence experimental, and fallible. My aim is to show, using Frege’s two-dimensional 
logical language as a paradigm of a “constructive” logic in Peirce’s sense, that taking this 
second theme into account in one’s interpretation of the first yield a very different, and 
arguably more fruitful, conception of meaning than is usually ascribed to Peirce, not only a 
different conception of the role of inference in meaning than is found in, say, Brandom 
following Sellars, but also a very different understanding of the role of pragmatics in 
semantics than is standard in social practice theories. 
 
 
Meaning, the pragmatist tells us, lies in use. This slogan has, however, come to 
have many uses in philosophy, and as a result has come to mean different 
things in different contexts. My interest here is in its use, and meaning, for 
Peirce. The aim is to clarify Peirce’s idea that the content of a claim lies not in 
its truth conditions but instead in what follows if it is true, in its consequences, 
and to do so by developing a suggestion Peirce makes in the sixth of his 
Harvard lectures (delivered on 7 May 1903): that we should accept Kant’s 
dictum that necessary reasoning only explicates the meaning of one’s premises 
but “[reverse] the use to be made of it”. Instead of starting with a conception 
of meaning on the basis of which to understand necessary reasoning, as Kant 
does, we are to start with actual instances of necessary reasoning in 
mathematics and “use the dictum that necessary reasoning only explicates the 
meanings of the terms of the premises to fix our ideas as to what we shall 
understand by the meaning of a term”.1 It is actual mathematical practice, in 
particular the necessary reasoning it involves, that is to teach us how to think 
about meaning. Because, on Peirce’s view, necessary reasoning is essentially 
diagrammatic, an adequate understanding of his pragmatist conception of 
                                                 
1 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Essential Peirce, vol. 2, ed. The Peirce Edition Project 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 218-219. 
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meaning requires an understanding of diagrammatic reasoning. It is our use of 
diagrams in mathematics that is to teach us what we should understand by 
meaning—at least in mathematics.2 
Peirce aims to achieve an understanding of meaning through reflection on 
the actual practice of mathematics. What he finds, we know, is that meaning 
should be understood in terms of consequences. This puts him in the company 
of Frege, as we will see, and at odds both with (say) Brandom, who espouses a 
form of inferentialism that embraces both circumstances and consequences, 
and McDowell, who adopts instead a Davidsonian theory of meaning in terms 
of truth—though it should be noted that neither Brandom nor McDowell is 
concerned with meaning in mathematics in particular. Their focus, at least for 
the most part, is our everyday, conversational uses of language. 
But there are other differences as well between Peirce (and Frege), and 
Brandom, and McDowell, differences that reflect their very different 
conceptions of what our slogan that meaning lies in use itself means. Whereas 
for Brandom, we will see, the slogan provides the basis for the substantive 
theory construction Brandom undertakes in Making It Explicit, according to 
McDowell, it serves, more radically, to remind us that the sort of theory 
Brandom is after is profoundly misguided.3 As McDowell understands it, the 
insight that is captured in the thought that meaning lies in use entails that the 
only task for the philosopher is a quietist diagnosis and cure. Peirce is no 
quietist. He wants to advance our philosophical understanding, and he thinks 
he can do that by reflecting on our mathematical practice. Unlike Brandom, 
however, he does so from within the practice itself. As the point might be put, 
Peirce’s conception of the priority of use is modest, in McDowell’s sense (to be 
explicated), without being quietistic. 
Brandom describes Making It Explicit as “an investigation into the nature 
of language”: “the aim is to offer sufficient conditions for a system of social 
practices to count as specifically linguistic practices”.4 The investigation begins 
with Kant’s distinction between behavior in accordance with a rule (in the 
realm of nature, of causes) and action according to a conception of a rule (in 
                                                 
2 I have argued elsewhere that Peirce’s conception of meaning in terms of inferential 
consequences, although apt for the case of mathematical concepts, should not be extended 
to the case of the everyday concepts of natural language. See my “Pragmatism and 
Objective Truth” in New Pragmatists, ed. Cheryl Misak (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). 
3 See, for instance, John McDowell, “How not to read Philosophical Investigations: 
Brandom’s Wittgenstein”, in R. Haller and K. Puhl, eds., Wittgenstein and the Future of 
Philosophy: A Reassessment after 50 Years (Vienna: Holder, Pichler, Tempsky, 2002). 
4 Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. xi and 7. 
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the realm of freedom, reasons). But because action according to a conception of 
a rule presupposes rather than explains both one’s understanding of the rule 
and one’s awareness of one’s circumstances as circumstances in which the rule 
is correctly applied, Brandom also distinguishes, within the realm of freedom, 
between action that is explicitly undertaken according to a conception of a rule 
and action that is only implicitly so undertaken in practice. Thus for him, 
“there are three levels at which performances can be discussed: a level of norms 
explicit in rules and reasons, a level of norms implicit in practice, and a level of 
matter-of-factual regularities, individual and communal.”5 The fundamental, 
guiding thought of Making It Explicit is thatif anything is to be made of the 
Kantian insight that there is a fundamental normative dimension to the 
application of concepts (and hence to the significance of discursive or 
propositionally contentful intentional states and performances), an account is 
needed of what it is for norms to be implicit in practices. Such practices must 
be construed both as not having to involve explicit rules and as distinct from 
mere regularities.6  
Brandom argues that explicit rules of linguistic usage are intelligible only on 
the basis of rules implicit in practice that govern the use of explicit rules. The 
task of the theorist is to make explicit the form such a practice might take, a 
set of sufficient conditions for practices to count as linguistic, and so for the 
words that are uttered to count as meaning this or that. The task is to say in a 
way that does not presuppose any grasp of the nature of meaningful 
utterances—that is, as if from the outside, or side-ways on—what something 
would have to be able to do in order to count as saying. Brandom thinks, in 
other words, that a theory of meaning must be robust or full-blooded in 
McDowell’s sense: 
“if a theory of meaning is full-blooded with respect to a given concept, that 
means that it describes a practical capacity such that to acquire it would be to 
acquire the concept—and it effects this description not necessarily without 
employing the concept, but . . . ‘as from outside’ its role as a determinant of 
content . . . one can acquire the concept by being taught the practical capacity 
that the theory describes; and the theory describes that practical capacity 
without helping itself to the notion of contents in which the concept figures.”7 
But, McDowell argues, such a full-blooded or robust theory is not to be had; 
there is and can be no perspective outside of our practices from which to 
                                                 
5 Making It Explicit, p. 46. 
6 Making It Explicit, p. 29 
7 John McDowell, “In Defense of Modesty”, reprinted in Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 91-92. 
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explicate them, no “side-ways on” view from which to make explicit that 
which (according to Brandom) is implicit in our linguistic practice. To say that 
meaning lies in use just is to say, according to McDowell, that meaning lies 
open to view in use. Nothing is hidden. And because nothing is hidden there is 
nothing in need of explication (save for the fact that we think that something 
is hidden, and so in need of explication): “the outward aspect of linguistic 
behavior is essentially content involving, so that the mind’s role in speech is, 
as it were, on the surface—part of what one presents to others, not something 
that is at best a hypothesis for them”.8 If McDowell is right, the only account 
of meaning that is possible is a modest theory, where “a modest theory of 
meaning, by design, starts in the midst of content”.9 Davidson’s conception of 
a theory of meaning in terms of truth conditions is just such a theory insofar as 
it sets out the truth conditions of sentences in terms that are antecedently 
understood. 
Adherents of modest theories of meaning tend to be quietists. They tend to 
think that once one sees that a theory of meaning must be modest, that there 
is no sideways-on perspective from which to theorize in the manner of 
Brandom, one will see that there is no task for philosophy but the therapeutic 
one of uncovering the confusions that led us to think that there was a 
philosophical issue in need of resolution or explication in the first place. Peirce, 
I have suggested, is neither immodest nor quietist. On his view, we are to look 
to use, not sideways on, as if from outside meaning and content, but precisely 
as contentful. The task is to gain insight into the nature of meaning (at least 
for the case of mathematics), to say something substantive about what 
meaning is, by reflecting on use, actual mathematical practice. It is to this task 
that we now turn. 
According to the received view, due to Russell, the modern symbolic logic of 
relations enables us to dispense with diagrams in our reasoning.10 The logic of 
relations is not, or at least is not supposed to be, just more of the same. Peirce 
came to think that this is a mistake. 11 According to him, “all necessary 
                                                 
8 “In Defense of Modesty”, p. 100. 
9 “In Defense of Modesty”, p. 104. 
10 See Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1903), 
especially §§4 and 434. 
11 Even Peirce himself at first thought that reasoning in logic is essentially symbolic rather 
than diagrammatic. Only after careful study did he come to hold that this is wrong, and so 
to think that his own “analyses of reasoning surpass in thoroughness all that has ever been 
done in print, whether in words or in symbols,—all that De Morgan, Dedekind, Schröder, 
Peano, Russell, and others have ever done,—to such a degree as to remind one of the 
difference between a pencil sketch of a scene and a photograph of it” (EP ii 206). 
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reasoning is diagrammatic; and the assurance furnished by all other reasoning 
must be based upon necessary reasoning. In this sense, all reasoning depends 
directly or indirectly upon diagrams”.12 Indeed, Peirce came to hold, the logic 
of relations itself reveals the diagrammatic character of all reasoning: “all 
reasoning of the degree of intricacy of elementary geometry . . . involves the 
logic of relations, so that without that logic the gist of reasoning cannot be 
stated . . . That feature, obtrusive enough in reasoning about relations, is that 
in all reasoning there must be something amounting to a diagram before the 
mind’s eye, and that the act of inference consists in observing a relation 
between parts of that diagram that had not entered into the design of its 
construction.”13 
Mathematical reasoning is, for Peirce, paradigmatic of necessary reasoning, 
but reasoning with diagrams is constitutive of mathematical reasoning; so 
according to Peirce, “Demonstration or Deductive Argumentation is best 
learned from Book I of Euclid’s Elements”.14 To understand the nature of 
deductive reasoning, we must understand Euclid’s reasoning in the Elements — 
say, in the very first proposition. 
In the first proposition of Book I of the Elements, we are taught to construct 
an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight line. The demonstration begins 
with a setting out: let AB be the given straight line. A statement of what is to 
be done follows: to construct an equilateral triangle on AB. Then the 
construction is given: 
[C1.] With center A and distance AB let the circle BCD be described  
[licensed by the third postulate]. 
[C2.] With center B and distance BA let the circle ACE be described 
[again,  
by the third postulate]. 
[C3.] From point C, in which the circles cut one another, to the points 
A, B  
let the straight lines CA, CB be joined [licensed by the first postulate on the 
assumption that there is such a point C]. 
                                                 
12 Charles Sanders Peirce, The New Elements of Mathematics, Vol. 4, Mathematical 
Philosophy, ed. Carolyn Eisele (Atlantic Highlands N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976), p. 314. 
13 New Elements, vol. 4, p. 353. See also Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, vol. 3, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burke (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1931), p. 350. 




The diagram that results is this. 15 
 
The apodeixis, which Peirce describes as “[tracing] out the reasons why a 
certain relation must always subsist between the parts of the diagram,”16 then 
follows:  
 
[A1.] Given that A is the center of circle CDB, AC is equal to AB licensed by 
the definition of a circle]. 
[A2.] Given that B is the center of circle CAE, BC is equal to BA [again by 
the definition of a circle]. 
[A3.] Given that AC equals AB and BC equals BA, we can infer that AC 
equals BC because what are equal to the same are equal to each other 
[Common Notion 1]. 
[A4.] Given that AB, BC, and AC are equal to one another, the triangle 
ABC is equilateral [by the definition of equilateral triangle, on the assumption 
that there is such a triangle ABC]. 
This triangle was constructed on the given finite straight line AB as 
required, and so we are done. 
The first thing to note about this little demonstration, at least as Peirce 
understands it, is that the reasoning is general throughout.17 A drawing that 
one makes (for instance, of a line or circle) is not an instance of the relevant 
geometrical figure but instead functions as a Peircean icon exhibiting the 
content of the concept of some geometrical figure. Because geometrical figures 
such as circles, lines, and squares are defined by the relations of their parts, 
and these relations can be iconically represented in a diagram, one can exhibit 
in a drawing those contents themselves. The drawing of (say) a circle, in the 
context of a Euclidian demonstration, looks circular not because it is an 
instance of a circle but because it iconically represents what it is to be a circle, 
namely a plane figure all points on the circumference of which are equidistant 
                                                 
15 This image is taken from Thomas L. Heath’s edition of The Thirteen Books of the Elements, 
3 vols. (Toronto, Ont.: Dover, first ed. 1908, second ed. 1956), vol. 1, p. 241. 
16 Essential Peirce, vol. 2, p. 303. 
17 This point is argued at much greater length in my “Diagrammatic Reasoning in Euclid’s 
Elements”. 
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from a center. The drawing, in other words, denotes a circle though no circle in 
particular: it is “what is called a General sign; that is, it denotes a General 
object”.18 As we would say, it denotes a concept, but it does so not 
symbolically, by signifying the concept using a merely conventional symbol, 
but instead iconically, through a homomorphism between the spatial relations 
among the parts of the drawing, on the one hand, and the constitutive 
relations among the parts of circles, on the other. 
Now, according to Peirce, “diagrams . . . show, — as literally show as a 
Percept shows the Perceptual Judgment to be true, — that a consequence does 
follow, and more marvelously yet, that it would follow under all varieties of 
circumstance accompanying the premises”.19 A diagram, on his account, shows 
something that is not only true but also necessary. Indeed, Peirce rejects the 
sort of symbolic account that logicians give of, say, syllogistic reasoning 
precisely because conceived symbolically, rather than iconically, a syllogism 
“would fail to furnish Evidence” where this evidence “consists in the fact that 
the truth of the conclusion is perceived, in all its generality, and in the 
generality the how and why of the truth is perceived”.20 Having drawn a 
particular diagram according to certain specifications, it is then possible to 
“[trace] out the reasons why a certain relation must always subsist between 
the parts of the diagram”.21 But how exactly is this to work? In particular, 
how does one move, say, in proposition I.1, from a claim about radii of circles 
to a claim about a triangle? 
It is a familiar, distinctive, and even notorious feature of reasoning with a 
Euclidean diagram that one can read off of a diagram more than was put into 
it, for example, the existence of a point at the cut of two lines. Peirce takes this 
reading off as itself an inference: “the act of inference consists in observing a 
relation between parts of that diagram that had not entered into the design of 
its construction”.22 Now in a sense we do this already in using, say, Euler 
diagrams. If I draw a circle, then another inside it, and a third inside that 
second circle, I can then observe a relation between the first circle and the 
third circle that had not entered into the design of my construction. In Euclid 
the idea is much more radical: in the course of a Euclidean demonstration not 
only new relations between given parts but wholly new geometrical entities 
emerge. As we will see in more detail below, the parts of a Euclidean diagram 
                                                 
18 New Elements, vol. 4, p. 315, n. 1. 
19 New Elements, vol. 4, p. 318. 
20 New Elements, vol. 4, p. 317. 
21 Essential Peirce, vol. 2, p. 303. 
22 New Elements, vol. 4, p. 353 
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are not merely parts of the diagram taken as a whole; they are parts of the 
icons of geometrical entities discernable within the diagram, parts that can be 
combined and recombined to form new wholes, that is, icons of new 
geometrical entities. This possibility, which has no analogue in Euler 
diagrams, is critical to an adequate understanding of the process of reasoning 
in Euclidean demonstrations with diagrams. 
In the diagram of proposition I.1 one sees certain lines now as icons of radii, 
as required to determine that they are equal in length, and now as icons of 
sides of a triangle, as required in order to draw the conclusion that one has 
drawn an equilateral triangle on a given straight line. The cogency of the 
reasoning clearly requires both perspectives. But if it does then the Euclidean 
diagram, that is, the array of drawn lines, functions in a way that is very 
different from the way (say) an Euler diagram (more exactly, the array of lines 
making up such a diagram) functions. By contrast with an Euler diagram, the 
various collections of lines and points in a Euclidean diagram are icons of, say, 
circles, or other particular sorts of geometrical figures, only when viewed a 
certain way, only when, as Kant would think of it, the manifold display (or a 
portion of it) is synthesized under some particular concept, say, that of a circle, 
or of a triangle.23 The Euclidean drawing, as certain marks on the page, has 
(intrinsically) the potential to be regarded in radically different ways (each of 
which is fully determinate albeit general). It is just this potential that is 
actualized in the course of reasoning, as one sees lines now as radii and now as 
sides of a triangle. 
I have suggested that the drawn points and lines discernable in a Euclidean 
diagram function as icons of geometrical figures only relative to a way of 
regarding those drawn points and lines. What is from one perspective, say, a 
radius of a circle is from another a side of a triangle. It follows directly that 
Euclidean diagrams involve three distinct levels of articulation. At the lowest 
level are the signs for the primitive parts, the points, lines, angles, and areas 
out of which geometrical figures are constructed. At the second level are 
constructions, out of these signs, of icons for the (concepts of) geometrical 
objects themselves, the objects that form the subject matter of geometry, all of 
which are wholes of those primitive parts. At this level we find points as 
endpoints of lines, as points of intersection of lines, and as centers of circles; we 
                                                 
23 Significantly, the thought that a system of signs may function not by way of 
combinations of primitive signs that have designation independent of any context of use, 
but instead by appeal to primitive signs that designate only given a context of use, is 
developed also in Sun-Joo Shin’s reading of Peirce’s notation for his alpha logic in The 
Iconic Logic of Peirce’s Graphs (Cambridge, Mass, and London: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 
2002). 
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find angles of various sorts that are limited by lines that are also parts of those 
angles; and we find figures of various sorts. At the third level, finally, is the 
whole diagram, which is not itself an icon of any geometrical figure but within 
which can be discerned various (icons for) second-level objects depending on 
how one configures various collections of drawn lines within the diagram. It is 
these three levels of articulation, which enable a variety of different analyses 
or carvings of the various parts of the diagram, that account for the ways in 
which one can radically reconfigure parts of intermediate wholes into new 
(intermediate) wholes in the course of a Euclidean demonstration, and thereby 
demonstrate significant and often surprising geometrical truths. 
In Euclid’s first proposition, a line that is at first taken iconically to 
represent a radius of a circle is later taken iconically to represent a side of a 
triangle. And as already noted, it is only because the drawing can be regarded 
in these different ways that one can determine, first, that certain lines are 
equal (because they can be regarded as radii of a single circle) and then 
conclude that a certain triangle is equilateral (because its sides are equal in 
length). The demonstration is fruitful, a real extension of our knowledge, for 
just this reason: because we were able to see a part of one whole as combined 
with a part of another whole to form an utterly new and hitherto unavailable 
whole, we were able to discover something that was simply not there, even 
implicitly, in the materials with which we began. Regarded one way two lines 
are seen to be equal (because they are radii of a single circle), regarded another 
they are seen to be the sides of a triangle. It is thus a perceptual skill that is 
required if one is to understand a course of diagrammatic reasoning in Euclid. 
Necessary reasoning, as Peirce understands it, essentially involves 
perception, the capacity literally to see that the consequence follows, indeed 
must follow. At least for the case of a Euclidean demonstration, this seems 
deeply right. In order to follow, that is, to understand, a Euclidean 
demonstration, one must be able to see various drawn lines and points now as 
parts of one iconic figure and now as parts of another. The drawn lines are 
assigned very different significances at different stages in one’s reasoning; they 
are interpreted differently depending on the context of lines they are taken, at a 
given stage in one’s reasoning, to figure in. It is just this, I have suggested, 
that explains the fruitfulness of a Euclidean demonstration, the fact that its 
conclusion is, as Kant would say, synthetic a priori. In Euclid, the desired 
conclusion is contained in the diagram, drawn according to one’s starting point 
and the postulates, not merely implicitly, needing only to be made explicit (as 
in a deductive proof on the standard construal or in an Euler diagram), but 
instead only potentially. The potential of the diagram to demonstrate the 
conclusion is made actual only through a course of reasoning in the diagram, 
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that is, by a series of successive refigurings of what it is that is being iconically 
represented by various parts of the diagram. Parts of wholes must be taken 
apart and combined with parts of other wholes to make quite new wholes. And 
this is possible (again) because the various parts of the diagram signify 
geometrical objects only relative to ways of regarding those parts. A given line 
must actually be construed now as an iconic representation of (say) a radius of 
a circle and now as an iconic representation of a side of a triangle, if the 
demonstration is to succeed. The diagram, more exactly, its proper parts, must 
be actualized, now as this iconic representation and now as that, through one’s 
recognition of them as such representations, if the result is to emerge from 
what is given. Only a course of thinking through the diagram can actualize the 
truth that it potentially contains. 
The question now of course is, given this account of the use of diagrams in 
Euclid’s mathematical practice, what can we infer about meaning? Notice, 
first, that meaning, in one obvious sense, is given by definitions in Euclid; we 
are told what it is to be a circle, or a triangle, or a square. But we are also 
provided with postulates setting out the primitive constructions that are 
allowed in the system. Together these definitions and postulates (as well as any 
previously demonstrated constructions, which function in later demonstrations 
as derived postulates) determine what we might think of as the circumstances 
and consequences of applying (in a broad sense) various terms for geometrical 
entities to collections of lines and points in a diagram. A finite line length 
provides the circumstance for the introduction of something correctly 
described as a circle, and a consequence of this introduced figure is that any 
two of its radii are equal in length. More generally, it is the postulates, whether 
primitive or derived, that constrain what can be put into a diagram, the 
definitions that determine what can be taken out. But if that is so, then 
although the definitions provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something’s being, say, a circle, what is exhibited in the diagram should be 
conceived in terms of consequences alone. 
This is most obvious in the case of reductio demonstrations in Euclid. The 
diagram—for instance, that of two circles that, impossibly, cut each other at 
four points, as in Proposition III.10—encodes, iconically, not something that 
is, or could be, the case, but instead (as Frege would say) everything necessary 
for a correct inference on the supposition needed for the demonstration. 
Although one does need to know the sufficient conditions for something to be, 
say, an equilateral triangle in order to see one in the diagram, and so to infer, 
as in Proposition I.1, something about equilateral triangles, what must be put 
into the diagram as the basis for such an inference, what must be displayed in 
it for the purposes of diagrammatic reasoning, is not what is sufficient but 
Meaning, Use, and Diagrams 
 379
what is necessary, that is, inferential consequences, not what is true but what 
follows. What the necessary reasoning of a Euclidean demonstration requires is 
the laying out in a diagram of the contents, that is, the inferential 
consequences, of the various concepts of Euclidean geometry. 
According to our account, reasoning in Euclid functions by exhibiting the 
contents of concepts of geometrical figures, that is, their inferential 
consequences, in such a way that various parts of those contents can be 
combined and recombined to realize something new. One comes in this way to 
see a necessary relation among concepts that was in no way present, even 
implicitly, in one’s starting point. But of course the contents, or inferential 
consequences, of most mathematical concepts cannot be exhibited in this way. 
Nevertheless, I want to suggest, they can be exhibited, and because they can, 
we can think of deductive reasoning in other areas of mathematics as similarly 
diagrammatic, as involving an essentially perceptual skill. Insofar as even 
strictly deductive reasoning does involve such a skill, it follows that in 
mathematics generally meaning as it is exhibited in the course of a proof 
concerns consequences, not, at least in the first instance, truth conditions. 
According to the standard understanding of symbolic languages, the 
primitive signs of the language are meaningful independent of any context of 
use. They are given by an interpretation or model assigning to each primitive 
sign some semantic value, the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of 
sentences in which it occurs. Frege asks us to envisage a radically different sort 
of symbolic language, one that functions, as we might say, diagrammatically, 
that is, like a Euclidean diagram insofar as the primitive signs only express a 
sense independent of their occurrence in a sentence (and relative to an 
analysis).24 Much as a particular drawn line is an icon of a radius of a circle (or 
of a side of a triangle) only in the context of a diagram and relative to a way of 
regarding it, so only in the context of a sentence and relative to an analysis do 
the signs of Frege’s language, whether simple or complex, designate. 
Consider, for example, this sentence of arithmetic: 24  = 16. As we first 
learned to read this sentence, the various numerals designate numbers prior to 
and independent of their involvement in the sentence, and the sentence as a 
whole is read as exhibiting an arithmetical relation among those designated 
numbers: that two raised to the fourth power is equal to sixteen. Frege teaches 
us to read this sentence in a new way, as exhibiting only a sense, Sinn, that is, 
a Fregean thought, one that can be analyzed in various ways into function and 
argument, none of which are privileged. Taking ‘2’ as marking the argument 
                                                 
24 The reading of Frege that is assumed here is developed and defended in my Frege’s Logic 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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place, for example, the sentence expresses the judgment that two is a fourth 
root of sixteen; that is, on this analysis, the expression ‘ξ4 = 16’, in which ‘ξ’ 
marks the argument place, is a concept word designating the concept fourth 
root of sixteen. But other analyses are possible as well. We can, for instance, 
take ‘4’ to mark the argument place, leaving ‘2ξ = 16’ as a complex sign 
designating the concept logarithm of sixteen to the base two. We can also take 
both ‘2’ and 16’ as marking the argument places of the relation ‘ξ4 = ζ’, that is, 
the relation of a number to its fourth power. Or we can take ‘24’ and ‘16’ as the 
arguments for the relation of equality. And other analyses are possible as well. 
Sentences written in Frege’s two-dimensional Begriffsschrift notation are 
essentially similar. The primitive signs of that language express senses 
independent of any context of use, senses that determine the senses of 
sentences formed by combining those primitive signs. Such sentences can then 
be variously analyzed into function and argument depending on how they are 
regarded, and each such analysis will yield truth conditions for the sentence 
taken as a whole. Independent of any analysis one has only the thought 
expressed and the truth-value designated. 
Although we first learn to read arithmetical equations as built up out of 
antecedently meaningful parts, we can (on that basis) learn to read those same 
equations differently, as exhibiting Fregean senses, thoughts that are 
variously analyzable into function and argument. And the same is true, I have 
indicated, of a sentence in Frege’s logical language. Notice, now, that on this 
new reading a sentence displays three levels of articulation. At the lowest level 
are the primitive signs out of which everything is composed. At the highest 
level is the whole sentence expressing a thought. Between these two levels, 
finally, are the various concept words and object names that are given relative 
to an analysis of the sentence. Much as one can see different figures in a 
Euclidean diagram depending on how one regards various collections of 
primitives of that system, so one can see different concept words in a sentence 
expressed in Frege’s Begriffsschrift notation depending on how one regards its 
collection of primitives, depending, that is, on how one carves it into function 
and argument. Much as a drawn figure (as seen from one particular 
perspective) functions iconically in a Euclidian demonstration to exhibit 
relations of parts in a geometrical figure, so an array of primitive signs 
(conceived according to some particular analysis into function and argument) 
functions in Frege’s notation to exhibit the content, the sense, of a concept 
word. 
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As conceived in standard quantificational logic, the content of, say, the 
mathematical notion of the continuity of a function at a point is given by the 
truth conditions of the claim that a function f is continuous at a point a: 
(∀ε>0)(∃δ>0)(∀x)(|x| < δ ⊃ |f(x + a) – f(a)| < ε). 
This sentence, read as it is normally read, is composed of antecedently 
meaningful parts as specified in a standard semantics for the language, parts 
that are combined into a whole according to the syntactic rules of the 
language. The concept of continuity, on this account, is nothing over and 
above its parts in a given logical array. That same concept, as Frege conceives 
it, is defined in Begriffsschrift thus:25 
 
This sentence, read as Frege comes to read such sentences, only exhibits a 
sense, a Fregean thought, independent of any analysis—though in fact, in this 
case, an analysis is already indicated. We are to take the Greek letters ‘Φ’ and 
‘Α’ to mark the argument places for a higher-level concept word. What we 
have in this totality of signs, then, is an expression that designates (relative to 
the given analysis) the concept of continuity. But this sign is complex; it has 
parts each of which expresses a sense. The whole then expresses a sense making 
it abundantly clear just what that content is.26 
Furthermore, and this really is the essential point, if this complex expression 
occurs in the context of a whole sentence (if, that is, the arguments places are 
appropriately filled), then that whole sentence can also be differently analyzed, 
analyzed so as to yield different concept words, not the concept word for 
continuity at all. A fruitful proof in Begriffsschrift inevitably requires just that, 
different analyses, at different points in the proof, of the various sentences 
involved in the proof; in the course of the proof, one must conceive a sentence 
now in one way (under one analysis) and now in another. More specifically, 
and just as we find in the case of a diagram in Euclid, a thought must be seen 
one way (in light of one analysis) if one is to see why it is true, but quite 
differently if one is to see what can be made to follow from it. Reasoning in 
                                                 
25 Frege presents this analysis of the concept of continuity in “Boole’s Logical Calculus and 
the Concept-script”, in Gottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Hans Hermes, Friedrich 
Kambartel, and Friedrich Kaulbach, and trans. Peter Long and Roger White (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 24. 
26 See “Boole’s logical Calculus and the Concept-Script” for many more examples. 
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Frege’s Begriffsschrift thus involves precisely the same sort of perceptual skill 
that is required in the diagrammatic reasoning of Euclid. 
In Frege’s system of notation, as in a diagram in Euclid, three levels of 
articulation are discernable in a sentence. At the lowest level are the primitive 
signs expressing senses. At the highest level are sentences expressing thoughts, 
that is, senses that are a function of the senses of the primitives that make up 
the thought. And finally, between these two extremes, are the concept words 
expressing senses and designating concepts that are discernable in light of an 
analysis of the thought expressed. The whole sentence is like a Euclidean 
diagram insofar as its parts can be seen now this way and now that. 
Furthermore, as I have indicated, these various perspectives are often required 
in the course of a deduction in Frege. But if that is right, then reasoning in 
Frege’s system of logic, just as in Euclid, constitutively involves a perceptual 
skill, the capacity to see a given array of signs now one way and now another. 
And just as in Euclid, the course of reasoning is necessary to actualize the 
potential of the list of sentences to constitute a proof. The proof is not in the 
sentences but in what they enable one to see, namely, a certain relationship 
between premises and conclusion, the relation of entailment. Proof is not, then, 
reducible to a set of sentences, or to a relationship among the sentences of some 
set. A collection of sentences can constitute a proof only for someone who 
already understands the practice of proof, the use of signs in proving 
something. For, as in Euclid, the conclusion is not contained in the premises 
merely implicitly, needing only to be made explicit; it is contained in the 
premises potentially, a potential that is actualized only through a course of 
reasoning on the part of a thinker. As  
Frege himself puts the point, “here, we are not simply taking out of the box 
again what we have just put into it. The conclusions we draw from it extend 
our knowledge, and ought therefore, on Kant’s view, to be regarded as 
synthetic; and yet they can be proved by purely logical means, and are thus 
analytic. The truth is that they are contained in the definitions, but as plants 
are contained in their seed, not as beams are contained in a house.”27 
Only in a notation read diagrammatically, that is, as exhibiting a content 
that can be variously analyzed into function and argument, rather than 
symbolically (its primitives as having meaning, designation, independent of 
any context of use), can this be true. 
Much as Peirce does, Frege thinks of meaning, as it is to be exhibited in an 
array of lines and symbols for the purposes of reasoning, in terms of 
                                                 
27 Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1980) §88. 
Meaning, Use, and Diagrams 
 383
consequences. What is displayed, or “fully expressed”, in Begriffsschrift is 
“everything necessary for a correct inference”.28 Although truth conditions can 
be formulated for a sentence of Begriffsschrift by giving an analysis of it, what 
such sentences directly map, what they display (and indeed display iconically, 
though I have not tried to show that here), is not what is the case if they are 
true but what follows if they are true. And although Frege was not as self-
conscious as Peirce was about why is this the right way to proceed, he like 
Peirce looked to mathematical practice, to the mathematician’s use of concepts 
in reasoning, as his guide to this understanding of meaning. It was as a 
practicing mathematician that Frege developed his notation; he wanted a 
notation that would be not an empty formalism but a means of expressing 
content as it matters to mathematical practice.29 The aim was not to abstract 
from content but to express it. The only question was what content, as it 
matters to mathematics, is. The answer, as Frege came explicitly to see by the 
early 1890s, is Sinn. Much as the axioms of a theory contain, as in a kernel, 
that is, potentially, all the theorems that can be derived from them, so a 
thought, the sense of a sentence, contains as in a kernel, that is, potentially, all 
its consequences. When we apply mathematics to the natural world we are 
concerned with what is the case if our mathematical claims are true. What 
both Peirce and Frege saw is that in mathematics itself we are concerned 
instead with what follows if those claims are true. We are concerned with 
consequences. 
According to the received view, meaning is to be understood in terms of 
truth. The meaning of a primitive sign is its semantic value, the contribution it 
makes to the truth conditions of a sentence. A sentence, then, is to be read as 
presenting, or representing, a state of affairs, what is the case if it is true. On 
Brandom’s inferentialist alternative, sentences are to be understood instead in 
terms of their inferential circumstances and consequences, in terms, that is, of 
what they follow from together with what follows from them. On Brandom’s 
account, instead of taking words to have meaning in virtue of the 
contributions they make to the truth conditions of sentences, we are to take 
words to have meaning in virtue of the inferential relations they are caught up 
in. Not word-world relations but word-word relations are primary. The 
account sketched here is different again. According to Peirce and Frege, the 
notion of meaning that is needed to understand necessary reasoning in 
                                                 
28 Begriffsschrift, §3, translated T. W. Bynum and included in Gottlob Frege, Conceptual 
Notation and Related Articles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 
29 See, for instance, Frege’s “On the Aim of the ‘Conceptual Notation’”, included in Bynum, 
Conceptual Notation and Related Articles. 
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mathematics concerns neither truth conditions (as on the standard view) nor 
inferential relations among sentences, or derivatively, words (as Brandom 
thinks). The conception of meaning that is needed concerns not relations among 
sentences, or words, at all but instead the contents of concepts as those contents 
are involved in inference. Such contents, we have seen, can in certain cases be 
exhibited in Euclidean diagrams; in other cases they are exhibited in the 
complex signs of Frege’s Begriffschrift. And as I have indicated, these contents 
so exhibited enable inference, diagrammatic reasoning, because they display 
collections of primitives that can be variously regarded, and need so to be 
regarded in the course of reasoning. At least for the case of mathematical 
concepts, then, we can say exactly what meaning is: it is nothing more and 
nothing less than what is exhibited in Euclidean diagrams and in 
Begriffsschrift expressions, diagrams and expressions that directly display the 
senses of concept words, senses within which are contained everything 
necessary for a correct inference. At least as applied to the case of 
mathematics, Peirce’s pragmatist maxim that meaning lies not in truth 
conditions, what is the case if a sentence is true, but instead in inferential 
consequences, what follows if a sentence is true, captures just this thought. 
 
 
